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The security concept

Page, Glen Boysen, Jr., M.A.

The University of Texas at Arlington, 1987

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300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THE SECURITY CONCEPT

by

GLEN B. PAGE JR.

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THE SECURITY CONCEPT

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ABSTRACT

THE SECURITY CONCEPT

Glen B. Page Jr.

The University of Texas at Arlington, 1987

Supervising Professor: Dale Story

The term "security" has become a popular phrase over the last forty years. Its use has increased over a wide variety of relational levels; whether local, national, or international. This concept is explored in three ways. First, security is thought of as a theme of history. As a theme of history security could be used in a title to describe the era we are presently living in. The Age of Insecurity is suggested as an example of such a title. As a name given the age, security represents a complex of themes and counter-themes which represent the dilemmas facing makind. These are listed. The origin of the "national security state" is located in the experiences of major institutions during the Second World War. The second approach attempts to enterpret the ordinary language sense of the word "security." A claim is made that

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this exercise is an example of ordinary language analysis applied to a political concept. The analysis determines that security is inherently complex and ambiguous; that "security mindness" requires strategic thinking: and that security is usually closely associated with other positive values. The final approach to the study of security analysizes the use of the term in the international relations literature. Following Barry Buzan, the underdeveloped character of the security concept is discussed. Finally, some of the advantages of a more fully developed security concept are enumberated.

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CHAPTER I

SECURITY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDY OF POLITICALLY CONTESTED CONCEPTS

The word "security," the ideal of security, concepts defining security, scholarly treatments of dilemmas purporting to involve security, and the continuous advertisement of the value "security" have become ubiquitous over the last forty years. This is true whether one is considering the local community, the intra-national, or the inter-national level of relationship. At the local level there has developed a full grown industry advertising a large range of "security" services for businesses, buildings, activities, or persons. At the national level, beginning with the Second World War, but escalating dramatically during the early Cold War and the political disturbances known as McCarthyism, there developed an intra-national organization of surviellances aimed at subversions from within or penetrations of the national fabric by hostile agents from without. This surviellance activity was legitimized by the appeal to "national security" that has become a hallmark of the modern era. At the international level, security has become something of an obsession. In the long march of European-centered civilization there has never been an equally long period of full-blown military preparation and activity, through episodes of both peace and war, as has been sustained in the present era. The paradox of modern times is that while there has developed a sustained, even

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expanding high levels of armaments, there is yet to be any major confrontation between the major powers. "Security" and "national security" have been used in multiple ways to describe, justify, and understand this state of affairs. In various ways and at different levels of relations there seems to be something about the nature of the word "security" which satisfies the intellectual fashion of our time.

This paper will explore this phenomenon. In doing so it will describe three approaches that could be taken to develop an understanding of the concept of security. The first is the study of a central theme of the modern era. Security, in the sense of a theme of history, could even be used as a name for the present age and thus would indicate the complex of themes and counter-themes that attend our awareness of present conditions. The second approach is an interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the word "security" that might generate insights into the phenomenon of its apparent growing all purpose use as explanation, justification, and rationalization. The third study is the study of the ideas security represents as it has been or can be organized and thought about as a problem in the study of modern national and international political relations. This paper will consider the usefullness of using the analysis of security as a means of understanding international relations and try to determine, first, if in fact there is justification for employing the idea of security for the theme of modern times and; second, whether a security analytic is a useful way

to think about the modern era. My thesis is: The modern era of national and international political relations can be better understood through the critique of the concept of security.

Before I begin this critique of a specific political concept, it is important that some groundwork be laid about the problems of studying political concepts generally. The critiques contemplated in this paper are different than many of the standard studies conducted in American social science. There is no attempt being made here to imitate the empirical studies of a subject field which have, here-to-fore, dominated political science investigation and research. The inspiration for this paper comes from those philosphical orientations which, for the most part, stand outside, if they do not oppose, the standard behavioralist orientation of American political science. These philosophical orientations might include those inspired by "the linguistic turn" of Wittgenstein; the "critique of ordinary language" school of English philosophy represented by, amoung others, Austin; the French intellectual paladin Michel Foucault; the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions; and the "critical theory" school led by Habermaus.[1] On the other hand, this paper has not been constructed with a view to fully imitate or "operationalize" any of these philosophical variations -- or even to explicate their "methodological" implications. i could not properly justify the procedures and studies of this

paper upon the philosophical tradition of any one of the above listed schools of thought. Such an effort might constitute a worthwhile continuation of the work begun here, but it is entirely beyound the scope of this paper. The spirit of the orientation of this paper was captured by Fred R. Dallinayr in a review of Richard Bernstein's Beyound Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis. Dallinayr argues:

> Ours is a time of crises or deep ferment -- not only politically but also intellectually: older school doctrine and entrenched philosophical positions are crumbling or being swept aside and replaced by more flexible and unconventional vistas. In the Anglo-American context, the sway of logical positivism -- focused on scientific epistemology -- has largely come to an end, making room for "postempericist" experimentation and the resurgence of pragmatist (or neopragmatist) modes of discourse: simultaneously, these changes are butressed and intensified by influx of Continental European perspectives stressing the interpretive and concrete-existential underpinnings of cognitive pursuits.[2]

There is a difficulty here however. Most studies of political affairs conducted in the post-war period have been conducted, at least in their academic articulations, within the tradition of the empirical school. As this school has actually operated it has been as much interested in a set of agreed-upon working procedures than it has been interested in

defending and expounding some underlying philosophical orientation. The philosophical quibbles one can raise with behaviouralism, therefore, have been some what mitigated in practice. This may be especially true in the case of the international relations field. Just the same, logical positivism has provided a background epistemology for American social studies; while behavioralism described a stragegy through which a methodological desiderata might be achieved. The principal effects of the behavioralist training have been (as it was meant to have been) first, a desensitization to language and discourse; second, an unjustifiable ignoring of historical context and significance; and, third, a subtle dulling of the critical-argumentative wit -- just what one might expect from an attempt to describe political action as "behavior." This training has left its mark on American political studies. On the whole they have been short on explaining the political character of politics.

This produces a quandry for those of us who insist on a different orientation. Since much of the relevant literature in a subfield has been produced under behavioralist auspices, there are few alternatives but to consult that literature. Much of what gets said, therefore, still references the articulations and purported dilemmas of an orientation which one is trying to supercede. Many recent studies which have self-consciously set out to move in the direction I am indicating here, therefore, come across as stradling both perspectives, the behavioralist and the "interpretative-

pragmatic," rather than of making the leap from one to the other. This clearly is the case with Barry Buzan's People, States, and Fear, which is never the less, the only major attempt to date that comes to terms with the importance and centrality of the security concept in the field of international relations.[3]

My purpose here, then, is to unabashedly take up the critique of a political idea -- in this case security. The first problem of describing the thematic and historical character of the security concept will be taken up in Chapter II. However, dealing with the whole subject indicated by the security theme would be a massive, perhaps impossible, task. This paper will therefore attempt to accomplish what might be considered a preparatory introduction to the subject rather than an exhaustive survey. I shall precede with several exercises aimed at this purpose. I will analysize the language and logic of security in Chapter III. I will then review Buzan's analysis of the underdeveloped character of the security concept as it has been used in the international relations literature. Finally, I will briefly outline Buzan's proposal for the development of the security concept and make a few concluding remarks upon this effort. These will be the subject of Chapters IV.

Before preceding, however, several problems about the difficulties of studying political language need to be addressed. The first difficulty involves the nature of the

traditional orientations. These generally diminished the difficulties of identifying and interpreting the meanings of political concepts and pushed to the fore-front problems of logic. The dictionary approach was taken to the meaning of terms: i.e., agreed upon references to authoritative texts were used as a short-cut to an interpretation of the implications of the use of political words and phrases. But can such a procedure be justified? If speech and persuasion are the essence of politics, as Aristotle has it,[4] and politics the essence of man, then this limiting of language to expand logic in recent American social science is surely unwarranted. Indeed any political word used in a political context contains the persuasions, arguments, and purposes (hidden or otherwise) that went into the development of the word originally; implications and associations it has picked-up in its intermediate history down to the present; and some flavor gained from the contemporary problems and predicaments with which the word is currently associated. Political words by their very nature, therefore, are used representationally. The meaning content of political words is so large we necessarily represent many things when we use them -- though we even then only represent a portion of the full meaning universe associated with the word. Indeed, in using political words we are making arguments about their meaning -- not merely indicating a clear-cut and precise definition of something. Political words are by their nature symbols. Using them represents more than a straight foreword,

uncomplicated definition: It represents or contains the
facts, considerations, and debates over which the meaning and
the value of that meaning have been fought.   Michael J.
Shapiro makes a similar point very succinctly when he argues
that empiricism...

> is an epistemological perspective that
> is politically insensitive.
> Specifically, the retention of an
> inadequate and misleading theory of
> meaning... has led to the neglect of the
> value commitments, institutional
> presuppositions, and models of
> individual and collective responsibilty
> and interest implicit in the concepts
> employed in political inquiries. These
> implicit presumptions, taken as a whole,
> comprise a significant aspect of
> existing or envisioned political
> arangements.   These political
> arrangements or institutions, which are
> implicit in the way we speak about
> politics, can be appreciated only in the
> context of an alternative model of the
> language/speech-reality relationship and
> language/ speech-person relationship, a
> model that regards language as
> constitutive of political phenomenon
> rather than as merely about political
> phenomenon.[5]

Quite some time ago W.B. Gallie observed that certain
words seemed to provoke disagreement over their appropriate
use. All of the examples he gave were concepts associated
with human activity or states of human affairs, rather real or
ideal; for example, democracy or social justice. He called
this class of concepts "essentially contested concepts."[6] The

point that both he and those who have sought to refine his insight have made, is that these concepts are contested because of something inherent in them -- not merely because someone arbitrarily choose to quibble over the meaning of one concept instead of some other concept. According to Shapiro:

> William Connolly has identified their contestability as a function of their involving contending interpretations which contain appraisive dimensions, of their complexity -- they are related to clusters of other concepts, which contribute to their possible meanings -- and the openness as to their criteria of application. After scrutinizing various concepts that appear to fulfill his criteria -- Democracy and politics for example -- Connolly concludes that contested concepts have a close connection between their normative point or orientation and the criteria of their application, for example, Democracy is oriented toward participatory governance, and criteria for applying it to various cases involve interpreting what is participating.[7]

Security meets all three of Connolly's requirements. The problem of whether a nation, for example, is secure given some international event, percieved shift in the balance of power, or projected weapons development requires an appraisive activity. When one thinks of the large number of ideas and problems refered to in statements and arguments expressed in reference to national security the full impact of Connolly's idea that contested concepts are complex because they contain

related clusters of other concepts is apparent. Last, the criteria for applying "the security of a nation" to various cases that require interpreting what is "securing a nation" involve a clearly debatable precept. So security is surely an "essentially contested concept."

I believe one can go beyond this idea, however, to presume that security is a member of the subclass of "essentially contested concepts" that could be described as a "politically contested concept." As noted above, politics is itself an "essentially contested concept." On might define a "politically contested concept" then as an "essentially contested concept" over which the difficulty of its political character is in dispute; either in the sense of whether it is political at all, or, more likely, in the sense of the problem of properly distributing the "contestment" of the concept to appropriate public forums and levels of public awareness. The security concept manifests this difficulty in multiple ways which will become apparent if we examine more closely the security concept as a "politically contested concept."

The word security by itself is not the operating phrase which is usually used to name the politically contested concept being scrutinized in this study. That phrase, of course, is "national security." The reason national security has come to represent this complex of ideas, instead of some other political phrase (power politics or national defense for example), has to do with national security's evocative qualities -- it is at once symbol and slogan. National

security is surely in the first rank of politically symbolic phrases. These aspects of the symbolic character of national security can be mentioned to illustrate its power: National security has a functional role in democratic and authoritarian ideologies. Indeed it appears to be ideologically flexible. National security is thought intrinsic to the constitution of the nation and is everywhere identified with sovereignity, self-determination, and national social purpose. Furthermore, its value has been exemplified by the great, successful, national security states -- the Soviet Union and the United States. The national security motief has been extended by the alliance and client state systems which both the US and the USSR embody and sustain; as well as by the large scale militarization process of exchanges from the industrialized areas of the globe to the semi-industrialized areas of the globe.[8]

There are, of course, undesirable aspects to the national security symbol. The risk of nuclear war and the presumably wasteful expenditures on military hardware are the most often mentioned. These, so far at least, only seem to have enhanced what might be called the "national security argument;" i.e., that a maximized (predominately military) advanced forward position (or at least sustainable position) is the most secure and otherwise propitious condition for a society and its government to be in. This argument has its various interpretations which seem, to date, to have had no

problem accomodating (presumably) restraining concepts such as -
arms control, super power cooperation and accommodation.
Indeed, as one begins to explore the multiple dimensions of
security problems, that is as one moves away from its rawest
formulation in the national security symbol appealed to in the
broadest political contexts, there emerges into better focus a
plethora of institutions and support groups which in their way
"own" some aspect of the security concept matrix. Groups such
as veterans organizations with their psychic stakes in the
military identity (not to mention their veteran benefits);
defense think tanks assigned the task of formulating war
scenerios; weapons research labs employed directly by the
government or contained within the organization of a defense
contractor, and the intelligence agencies (both the CIA and
the FBI) with their politically bestowed security missions are
examples. Each of these have what might be termed a "local
stakes" in the national security concept. Each evinces a
particular perspective and supposed expertise upon the
problems and dilemmas of actually supplying the nation with
security. "Security," more now than "national security,"
becomes the politically contested concept -- contested in
shades and nuances of meaning within the "political" (turf)
arguments that take place within such groups -- but contested
also in the differing attitudes of institutional interest that
compete more broadly through the media and political organs.

The political character of the national security
concept, then, is invested with the abstractions contained in

it as a political symbol, while it is simultaneously constituted from below by a large array of competing, though supportive, represen—tions of its embodied institution. National security has not always been the dominate "politically contested concept" in the international field; it has only emerged as groups, institutions, and political actors and thinkers have invested it with a larger and larger arena of "political arrangements." The story of its historical development is what I shall endeavor to describe next.

ENDNOTES

1. A general introduction to these orientations addressed to an American social science audience can be found in Richard Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978).

2. Fred R. Dallinayr, "Pragmatism and Hermeneutics," Review of Politics, Vol. 47, April 1985. No 2. p. 284.

3. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983)

4. Michael J. Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) p.5.

5. W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in Max Black (ed.), The Importance of Language (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1962) p. 121-46.

6. Shapiro, p. 207.

7. Ulrich Albert and Mary Kaldor, "Introduction," in Mary Kaldor and Asbjorn Eide (ed.) The World Military Order (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1979) p. 15.

CHAPTER II

THE AGE OF INSECURITY: THE EMERGENCE

OF AN HISTORICAL THEME

It would simplify matters a great deal if I could simply
proclaim that we are presently living in the "Age of Security"
and presume that everyone who knows what is going on and who
exhibits a degree of common sense would readily concur. It
would not matter very much if the proper title were more
accurate, "The Age of Insecurity;" or something more formal,
"The Age of National and International Security;" or something
less formal, such as "the national security era;" the
principle importance of an obsession with security and its
analysis would dictate the choice of era title. Perhaps, as
will be indicated below, the Age of Insecurity is the
preferable title. However, the truth is that up to now we
have not identified the times with these appellations. The
reason why is easy enough to understand in one sense: We are
still living in the era that we would identify with one of
these titles. It might be expected that it would take some
time after the Second World War to get a sense of the drift of
historical processes. This is so; but by describing the
present era as associated with security I am making an analogy
between the present era and the era from about 1870 to 1945
which has been called the Age of Imperialism.[1] It goes
without saying that any slice of time can be identified with a
variety of names and titles. We only play the game of

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choosing era titles, afterall, to thematically organize ourselves in understanding events and processes through time. But the analogy to the Age of Imperialism is an instructive one. It would help clarify the problem of designating the modern era if we first look at the Age of Imperialism.

That the period from 1870 to 1945 is an age of imperialism is verifiable in several ways. It is an era that has a recognizable beginning and end. It has been generally established that it symbolically began with Disraeli's famous Crystal Palace speech of 1872 in which he unapologetically proclaimed himself to be an imperialist.[2] Its ending encompassed both World Wars. From a long enough perspective, one would think, the two World Wars will look like one event -- or at least a single process. The era title, The Age of Imperialism, indicates several things. It identifies the primary dynamic of the age as that of the growth of industrialism as generated through the processes of capital accumulation. Imperialism consequently describes the relations between the states that disposed of the energies and capabilities thus created. Imperialism also indicated relations of rank and dominance and prescribed strategies for distribution (or redistribution) of position and benefits represented by that system of relations. It inextricably bound up issues of politics and economics. In fact, there is a rich texture of subthemes subsumed under the "imperialism" concept.

The word "imperialism" in its modern usage, dates from

the mid-1850's and originally was used as a term of caricature aimed at the "Empire" of Louis-Napolean.[3] Louis-Napolean, it may be recalled, won the election set up to choose a president for the Second Republic which was formed after the social upheavals of the late 1840's and early 1850's. In his name he embodied the past glories of France and in the election campaign appealed to the French nostalgia for the lost empire of his famous uncle. Thus in its original formulation "imperialism" was descibed by critics as the jingoistic expression of a bloated nationalist pretension. By a generation later, however, as Disraeli's famous speech indicates, a more favorable interpretation was being supported. In the last quarter of the century the term came to be proudly advocated by a new generation of Europeans to indicate the positive expression of their developing capabilities.[4] The implications were not universely appreciated however. So by the latter part of the 19th Century the term had already a lengthy history as a contested political concept. By the turn of the century more formal attempts to analysize the deeper implications of imperialism began to make an appearance. It is this literature that has had such a lasting impact on the 20th Century. By the dawn of the Second World War the subject of imperialism encompassed a massive literature and had literally absorbed the efforts of millions of people in trying to understand, criticize, justify, or undo it. At that point the decisive European

battle was about to be fought by one adversary representing the wholesale embracing of imperialism, Nazism; and another adversary representing itself as imperialism's avowed enemy, Leninism.

If the Age of Imperialism has come to an end why has the new era not been recognized and properly proclaimed? So, for example, we might agree that we are living in The Age of Insecurity. It could be argued that the era of convulsions representing the end of imperialism so dominated attention that for some time era titles unconsciously have still refered to the era of great war and its aftermath. The terms for the post-war era indicating the dynamics organizing and shaping international processes are generally more restrictive and less suggestive than "the Age of Imperialism" was. Such phrases as "the cold war", the era of the super-powers, the era of de-colonization, or the nuclear age are examples of such designators. Such names seem to refer to subthemes themselves and are not the grand organizers of subthemes that the Age of Imperialism was or, for that matter, the Age of Insecurity would be. It could also be argued that post war exhaustion produced the hope that wisdom might prevail and that some universal change might be instigated to blunt the ravages of war and militarism so that men might take control from what seemed to many to be an indifferent historical process. Such hopes coalesced in the creating and support of the United Nations. It is perhaps the disappointment of this hope and the reduction of the U.N.'s prestige that signals the

end of an interest in legal/moral world organization -- and thus bids us to take up once again the explanation of the jumbled problematics of forces and dynamics that shape world relations.

Even if, for whatever reason, we do not call our age The Age of Insecurity, security is, never the less, one of the great themes of modern times. As such it is similar to other familiar terms such as development and under-development; nationalism and internationalism; imperialism and anti-imperialism; democracy and authoritarianism; capitalism and socialism. These terms (and others) are used as organizing precepts, as well as concepts. Each term implies concepts, values, facts, goals, problems, dilemmas, and arguments. In one phrase they each represent argument universes. Each term references theories and beliefs about the relationship between its own internal ideational components. There is an evolutionary development in the use of such themes and of beliefs about their internal makeup. The development of their use can be described historically. We are interested in such ideas for their historical character, as well as their representation of explanatory or scientific propositions.

The historical origins of the present national security era can be found in the social and institutional experiences created by the two global wars; but particularly by the Second World War. The intense mass participation in a grand struggle for the determination of the national fate created a

political-social ethos which was bound to live on into the ensuing era of peace. Looked at from the perspective of the development of major institutions, the exigencies of the Second World War helped to organize or reorganize the characteristics of many of the post war institutions, determined the future interactions between those institutions, and allocated a status to many of them which they were later unwilling to give up. The case of the military in both the United States and the Soviet Union is particularly instructive. Both militaries as late as the late 1930's were diminished. The United States military was being suppressed by the isolationist mood of the country as well as by the Depression era notion that military spending was wasteful. The Soviet military was being subjected to the purges. By 1945, however, both military systems stood on top of the world -- at least, that is, they were both standing on Germany. At that time they not only represented their respective societies; they virtually embodied them. There would be no return to their status in the late 1930's. Indeed, if thought about from a certain point of view, the Cold War was bound to occur; not because the antagonisms were necessary, but because the cultural and institutional ways of life that originated in the Second World War were bound to be sustained.

While the post war institutional organization of the national security states still indicate their war time origins, there are now very changed conditions. Global war is no longer possible -- certainly not in the sense of another

World War II. The constituent make-up of the national security state and the interstate system of relations created by the national security states have combined to generate a specific conception of world reality; a set manner of interpreting world affairs. The institutions that have been the most active in shaping and embodying this conception of world affairs long ago learned their roles and have propagated that view of the world -- a high military profile, national security constantly dramatized in the most strident terms, a preoccupation with the technology of war, a busy-body approach to the rest of the world, a continuous scripting of events in the "news." Consequently, the security idea, in the sense of an historical theme, must be seen in more ways than just as a formula for defense. The theme is manifested in our consciousness through our ordinary language, in formal discourses, and in our view of the world. In the rest of this chapter I will attempt to describe some of the ways security as an historical theme seems to be articulated.

In ordinary language the word security seems to have many uses. It can be found with parallel meanings in entirely different meaning universes. We speak of "a security" meaning a financial instrument; or "security" meaning an individual's measure of personal assets usable in case of trouble. Security is found in phrases such as "social security" identify specific governmental programs. Most of these meanings are entirely irrelevent to the subject being

considered here. Even so this broad application does indicate the popularity the idea of security has. Furthermore, it probably is productive of occassional cross analogizing between different meanings of the word, with an attended confusion, insight, and expansion of the range of meanings the word signifies. The term has multiple uses even when its meaning is restricted to its political sense. For example, the phrase "national security" conjures different images ordinarily than does "international security". The casual appeal to "national security" as a justification for increased military expenditures has led many critics of such increases to conclude that "national security" is often used as a political euphemism -- having a meaning more like "the well being of the military establishment". Such misuses unfortunately confuse conceptual structures designed to explain international relations. On the other hand they tend to enhance the thematic importance of the values being indicated. In sum, these uses, missuses, and extraneous uses have expanded awareness of the idea of security. They have advertised it so to speak.

Whereas the social science literature about international relations has not fully developed the security concept, nevertheless a literature relevent to and making use of the idea of security has been in full development since the Second World War. A scrutiny of the complex issues involved in the security problem has become a massive intellectual enterprise. This literature has been developed under a number

of different subject names and organizing precepts. These include "international relations", "foreign affairs", the study of war and peace, the study of strategic relations, and so forth. Many students of these fields have been interested in, and often preoccupied with, security issues. Security, therefore, represents one thematic way to organize many of the problems common to these different fields.

The idea of security indicates important facts and dilemmas facing mankind. Security or, to be more correct, the lack of security is precisely the problem created by the existence of weapons of mass destruction. The existence of large scale nuclear arsenals with attached delivery systems is "the fact" of the international relations environment. This complex of destructive capacity as it evolves through time is so intriguing, so important, and so dynamic as to dominate recent thought about security issues. Actually, the focus on the security concept helps to over-ride this tendency so as to help connect this massive fact with the other dynamic factors in the international field. But the security theme also helps to remind us of a singular importance of the concern with this incredible fact -- of the existence of a massive destructive potential. As one consequence the security theme may be percieved (as its predecessor imperialism had before it) as a master dynamic forming, shaping, and subjecting other dynamics below it.

Conversely, the very limits upon behavior that such

massive war prospects indicate turns the dynamics unleashed by the armaments process back on itself, systematizing military preparation while precluding military engagement. A space is therefore opened in which there is time and occasion to ponder the current human predicament and its attended complexities. In a figurative sense this space is the blank page upon which the theme of security can be written. Thus a thoroughly active national self-consciousness attends military efforts. This is particularly conducive to the psychological element contained in the security idea. It could be argued that an almost hypersensitive security consciousness is a major component of the mental attitudes associated with the communication and thought processes involved in the weapons race. But, this consciousness may also call forth an effort to understand the security process so as to elucidate the rule of common sense in an era of development and rationalization of weapons of anhillilation.

Security can be used as an organizing precept for the present era because of a number of inter-related historical processes. The old system of international rank and order established during the era of imperialism has given-up its space to the development of a new dynamic. One feature of this new order is the locking-in of a global security dilemma by two antagonists. This could be called the cold war factor. This factor helps to organize and enhance many of the folloing developments of our age.

The end of imperialism can be partly described by the

break-up of the old colonial empires. Emergent nations were faced with the problems of national security, even if on a small scale, and they have made various attempts to solve their problem given the resources at their disposal. Over time the increase in competencies to forge military/diplomatic postures implied by the efforts of these new nations has meant that regional security dilemmas have become better defined and have been raised to international awareness. Examples of this, what Buzan calls "security complexes", are the Middle East (in totality and in sub-regions) and the Indian subcontinent.[5]

There are deeper processes at work that affect international affairs apart from the surface organizational relations of governments. There has been the development of an international economic system that has tended to facilitate the movement or exchange of security products. The global environment of commercial exchange has helped to make increments of military capabilities more acquirable than they might otherwise have been made by purely politically motivated exchanges. Here again superpower competition enhances and provides an underlying rational for a fully active international armaments exchange.

The accelerating pace of change in technological development means the nature of the field of operations for security, the battlefields themselves, is changing or about to. Such technical change, the strategic defense initive for

example, makes security formulas of the past (alliance systems, comparisons of GNP, or comparisons of arsenals) potentially unreliable. Thus the problem of understanding the security calculuses of the major actors in the international system is beginning to reach "future shock" proportions.

Finally there has been a gradual weakening of the international constraints -- both moral and propagandistic -- held against war and militarism in the post World War II era. This has included a decline in the prestige of the United Nations and the overall failure of an international peace movement. This decline appears to have left little besides a background of moralizing complaint against a foreground focusing upon military buildups.

ENDNOTES

1. See A.P. Thorton, <u>The Imperialism Idea and Its Enemies</u> (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968)

2. Richard Koebner and Helmat Dan Schmidt, <u>Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word</u>, 1840-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) p. xviii-xix.

3. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 15.

4. A.P. Thorton, p.ix-x.

5. Barry Buzan, <u>People, States, and Fear</u>, p. 105-116.

CHAPTER III

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEA OF SECURITY

AS IT IS FOUND IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE

There is a major division in American and English philosophy over the proper approach to language and the problems of language.[1] One approach is an edifying activity: It seeks to correct or replace language considered inappropriate or inadequate to some scientific or rational conception of reality. This approach was given its most elloquent expression in Wittgenstein's _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ and its most radical formulation by the school known as Logical-Positivism.[2] In general the "empirical" biases of American social science have emphasized this orientation. The second approach assumes that ordinary speech does not require "correction, translation, or replacement," even if "we sometimes speak ambiguously, carelessly, or mistakenly."[3] Instead it treats ordinary speech as an appropriate data for philosophical inquiry. This is the approach of Wittgenstein's latter writings, which were intended as a rejection of his earlier views expressed in the _Tractatus_. Hanna Pitkin identifies three schools of thought that developed around this orientation. The first was that associated closely with Wittgenstein and has been identified with Cambridge. The second school was identified with Oxford and is represented chiefly by J.L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle. The third is an American school developed through the impetus

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of scientific linguistics whose most distinguished representive is Noam Chomsky.[4]

While the advocates of these variations have had their desputes, Pitkin asserts that their ideas are mutually complimentary and together might form a basis for a new "language orientation" in political and social studies. Pitkin, however, would consider the "conceptual" rather than the specifically philosophical aspects of language so as to emphasize that the terms to be examined occur more "readily in political theory, in social-scientific theory, or indeed in any form of abstract, general conceptual thought.[5] In this chapter I will attempt to study, in the spirit of this approach, the ordinary meaning of security. To better accomplish this I will also consider the meanings of "secure" and "assurance" since these are particularly related terms.

Appendix A lists thesarus entries for security, secure, assurance. The list of synonyms for security conveys quickly the broadness of its meanings: safety, stability, pledge, guarantee, defense. Each of these has a sublist. The interrelation of these in practical application to national and international affairs is pertinent to the theme of security. What they have in common is that they represent instrumental approaches to a common goal. The goal is implied in the etimology of the word "secure;" i.e., se -- without, cura -- care (from the Latin) or more grammatically -- to free from care. Each synonym has in common with the others a reference to something; rather act, relationship or fact which

can serve as an instrument to a certain state of mind. Thus stability can be an instrumental condition to a carefree mind because it assures a person or society that little can change rapidly. Likewise, a pledge is a spoken instrument of assurance designed to calm the fears of those the pledge addresses that the pledgee can be trusted. Things (or ideas) which may instrumentally affect a state of mind are almost, by definition, infinite. There is, however, a certain pattern to the way in which the word security is used in English that describes a more specific set of concerns. Clearly the definition of security meaning "an amount of money (or its equal) deposited so as to demonstrate good faith on a loan" has little import to the meaning of the international theme being discussed here. However, when thought out, this idea is a lesson in itself. Something concrete (money) is used to measure and manipulate the probability of the future actions (repayment or default) of two parties in a relationship involving both cooperation and conflict. When it is thought about, many ideas of security imply this kind of internal dynamics between independent but mutually interacting parties.

The word "assurance" comes from the Latin ad securitas-- "to secure" or "to free from care". It is therefore a very closely related concept to security. One way to think of their relationship is that security represents a more or less implied theory or concept of what would constitute a satisfactory state of affairs, while assurance is given by

individual facts and thoughts that measure the degree of existence of this state of affairs. Security, therefore, requires assurances and in this sense, may be attained by a collecting of assurances. It was assumed above that security involves instruments or instrumental activity with respect to a presumably relaxed frame of mind -- a mind free of worry and fear. Since I have suggested that assurances may be collected to create such state of mind, to be consistent, it could be assumed that some opposite of an assurance, let us say a dis-assurance, can upset an otherwise relaxed mind. A simple idea emerges: A "mind", however shaped, acts and interacts to maintain some kind of positive equilibrium. Since the equilibrium of a mind (or a group of minds) can be assumed to be a rather delicate thing, "security consciousness" might be assumed to be a rather agitated state. Each piece of information must be examined for assurances or the lack of them. The "mind" must always seek re-assurance. Security, then, as a goal of the sensitive mind requires constant scrutiny. This gives to the idea of security a reflexive quality: Security must be secured.

The verb "secure" is used to indicate the gaining or improvement of possession or control over some desired object or position. It somewhat surprisingly departs from the more abstract idea found in security to imply something tangible. Based upon the problem presented above of creating and keeping an assured state of mind, possession and control represent effective strategies. Indeed in most situations they

represent "proven" strategies -- or at least there are general prejudices to that effect. Likewise, secure, the adjective, refers to safety and/or advantageous position or possession. Both the verb and adjective are persistently used in descriptions and accounts of military affairs and events. With reference to military applications the idea of security as safety is readily apparent. It signifies the gaining or control of advantages of strength or position in circumstances which may be deemed dangerous. Since the verb and adjective are clearly associated with the habitat and experience of military life and situations, it would seem that in the general notion of security there is often an echo of the military experience.

I believe some observations can be made upon this family of words and ideas. Security, it would seem, is most relevent to interactions between people. It may be used to refer to "securing" something from nature, but this use seems rare and may be metaphorical. Usually there is a someone secured or a thing which is secured for someone; and some possibility, individual, group, set of circumstances, and so forth, from which that person or thing must be secured. Those things from which security is sought are usually reducible to other persons or people directly, or the consequences of the actions and activities of others. Security, therefore, is closely related to strategy and strategic thinking, i.e., the consideration of actions by an actor in a field where other

actors are also acting. Therefore, many of the necessary calculations of each actor depend on the actions and intentions of the other actors. Broadly speaking there are different kinds of security goals and problems depending on the type of actors involved (rather individuals, groups, or nations) and the type of field the actors meet on; for example economic, social, political, or military. The word "security" as used in ordinary speech is applied to a variety of types of strategic problems where different kinds and combinations of actors and fields are implied. Table 1 summarizes some of these uses.

In Table 1, I have suggested that "social security" implies collectively insured programs underwriting individual or family financial well being. Also, "security agencies" are basically service companies providing protection services to groups (businesses) from implied threats of individuals. Likewise, the word security finds its uses in the other divisions. "Financial security", other than an advertising slogan, is a highly sought individual goal. "Security" is an important idea in finance and economics. It has a definite relationship to "insurance". The issues raised in this paper however, with respect to the "theme of security", are almost all in the lower right-hand corner of Table 1. The chart does indicate the wide-spread applicability of the idea of security to inherently different kinds of situations and relationships. Perusing this chart should create caution in using analogies taken from one kind of relational situation to apply to

TABLE 1

COMMONLY USED EXPRESSIONS USING THE WORD SECURITY
(S. = SECURITY)

	SECURED FROM: Individual/ family	Business/ Group/ Institution	Nation/ Society/ Exegencies of life
SECURED FOR: Individual/ Family	personal S. home S. (locks, alarms, etc.) security (ins. against claims) family S. (insurance)	family S. (insurance)	social S. financial S. (personal wealth) family S. (insurance and financial reserves)
Group/ Institution/ Business	S. departments (of an institution) S. agencies & S. gaurds S. deposits	Securities (financial instruments) business S. (ins. against legal claims) S. deposits	financial S. (corprate wealth) Securities (financial instruments)
Nation/ Society	national S. (in the sense of a defense against traitorous acts, secrete agents, etc.)	national S. (in the sense of surviellance of plots against the state, revolutionary parties, organized crime, etc.)	national S. (in the sense of defense against outside aggressions, & unfavorable international conditions) international S.

another. In fact, in everyday language, political speech, and journalistic writings this sort of thing is probably done constantly. Cross-analogizing of this kind is probably a source of a great deal of confusion as well as enlightenment.

This great applicability is largely compromised by conceptual fuzziness. Note that in many instances some of the above listed synonyms (e.g., safety, guarantee, defense) could replace security in the above chart with only slight changes of emphasis. It may be presumed, in fact, that security is highly associated with positive values generally; particularly with respect to conflict or goal oriented behavior. Both "victory" and "success" imply a derivitive acquisition of security. Likewise, some degree of security can be surmised, ordinarily, from past successes and/or victories. It is arguable, therefore, that security implies the achievement of prior success or position. Achievements in one field of endeavor -- for example, friendships and alliances, can be seen to enhance other endeavors, say property or wealth. For either individuals or nations once a few initial successes have been achieved a web of resources, relationships, values, and opportunity objects can then be spun together to uphold each other. The acquisition of a few of these both stimulates the appetite for and facilitates the acquisition of others. In the common expression security is being "built up". Such building diminishes the relative cost of any additional increments. New successes become easier to attain and new adversities easier to meet. Security can be thought to

increase within this "web of successes".

Within the life of societies it is easy to comprehend why symbols representing various myths, legends, and positive images may become important points within a "web" -- or to use a similar metaphor, the fabric of social consciousness. Connecting positive symbols together to uphold such a fabric of social consciousness appears to be general if not universal attribute of social identity. People seem determined to create meanings and connections between pieces of information and ideas even where there are no, or at best tenuous, connections. Security in reference to such a fabric may be thought of as both a single thread in the fabric, and at the same time, but in a different sense, a measure of the strength, certainity, or believability of the whole cloth. For example, security may, on the one hand, represent a formulistic measurement of a nation's military capabilities vis-a-vis its adversaries' capabilities. When journalist and military analysts make strict comparisons between Soviet and US arsenals something of this sort is being done. This is an example of what I am calling a single thread in the fabric of social identity and understanding. On the other hand, there are times that events bring into sharp focus the rightness or wrongness, the effectiveness or futility of such ideas and equations. In such instances emotions as well as reconsiderations and re-thinking may spread through a society. Such moments, it may be presumed, leave lasting images and a

sense about collective expectations. Probably all societies have both "bad" and "good" memories of these kinds and consequently have ambiguous notions about the degree of over all security with which they live.

This brief and very general summary of observations about the ordinary meanings of security and related words indicates a complicated set of ideas which seem to contain complex commentaries on themselves; a sort of inflexive complexity. This may be typical of any analysis of language: But in the case of security and its related words there are inherent reasons for the complexity. These words represent an ancient set of psychological notions that arose long before the appearance of any literary framework to isolate and connect psychological ideas and facts. Instead it represents a folk tradition of reporting and comparing indivdual and group experience. As with many commentaries on language subregions we discover a density of congealed experience that was laid down long before the modern age began.

One can, of course, try to look back into this experience through some lens of language criticism -- rather through linguistic or literary inquiries. One can take a stab at the hermenuetical enterprise of resurrecting the core experiences indicated in the common coins of frequently used words and phrases and thereby hope to edify the use of those words and phrases. This is what I believe I have attempted to do so far in this chapter. A lack of space and expertise will require a shortening of this endeavor here however. There are

two warning signs on this path in any account. The first begs the student not to expect too much from a study of the origins of these matters. I appeal to the authority of Shakespeare:

> There is scarce truth enough alive to make societies secure; but security enough to make fellowships accurst: much upon this riddle runs the wisdom of the world. This news is old enough, yet it is everyday's news. (Spoken by the Duke in response to "What's news?" in Measure For Measure.)[6]

Security and its dilemmas was as stubborn an enigma in Shakespeare's day and even before as it is today. Search the past how we may we may garner some insight, but we won't find answers.

The second warning sign goes to the core of my claim that security is a major theme of the current epoch. The meaning of the security idea is itself a battle ground. It is a battle being fought, not so much by definition seeking scholars, as by the propaganda apparatuses of major economic, political, and military institutions. These are hardly indifferent to the conceptualizations of academic expression, but they are more concerned about the public perception of the security idea. The advertising budgets of the Pentagon; the "persuasion" represented by the Political Action Committee money of the defense industry; and the glamorization of the gadgetry of modern war machines created in various genre of

Holywood films will have more to do with public conceptions of the relevant meanings of security than exercises of the kind developed in this paper. An unreflective use of the security concept will be more a product of the institutional persuaders than a product of edifying critiques. The institutional stakes in the meaning of security are so high the issue will be joined in the broadest arena money and power will afford. Security is, indeed, a "politically contested concept," but the range of that contest (or debate) and the depth of consideration it is given will itself be highly manipulated. It is a contest, therefore, that due to important vested interests will not be, perhaps can not be, conducted on an even playing field.

ENDNOTES

1. Hanna Pitkin, <u>Wittgenstein and Justice</u> (Berkley: University of California Press, 1972) p. 5.

2. Michael Shapiro, <u>Language and Political Understanding</u>, p. 9.

3. Pitkin, p. 5.

4. <u>Ibid</u>.

5. <u>Ibid</u>., p.6.

6. William Shakespeare, "Measure for Measure".

CHAPTER IV

THE SECURITY CONCEPT

IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE:

AN UNDERDEVELOPED CONCEPT

If security is an important current theme of history, as was argued in Chapter II, a final judgement pertaining to the merits of that theme may only be determined by events that have yet to occur or by considerations that have yet to be contemplated. Imperialism, it should be recalled, was once embraced as a favorable ideology/"view of the world" by various "conservative" advocates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There was not an Age of Imperialism because of some preponderance of imperialism advocates over anti-imperialism advocates however; instead, there was an Age of Imperialism because it occurred to many of the people then alive that they were caught-up in a system of affairs, a view of the world, and a program for making authoritative allocations -- i.e., an imperialistic system, view of the world, and program of allocations -- whether they advocated it or not. Some did advocate it; but others wished to better understand the consequences of imperialism and whether or not there were alternatives.

The security concept, therefore, will probably be better formulated in some future assessment of this histocial epoch in which it is rising to such preeminence. Today the dominant institutional and political interest in the leading countries

of the world have invested security with such scope and importance that it is developing into what amounts to an ideological formulation. It is one we may either live or die with it is true; and this concern has often produced a kind of obsession with strategic studies that has led many students of international relations to bypass any close scrutiny of the terms they employ. In fact, security has not been a closely observed idea in the literature about international issues. There is one exception: It is to Barry Buzan's credit that in People, States, and Fear he is the first to recognize the potential advantages of a careful analysis of the security concept.

Buzan begins his book by arguing that no one would deny that there is a national security problem in international relations. Since states are the highest form of political order achieved, they are the dominating level of organization in human affairs. Unfortunately states seem to be incapable of founding a satisfactory form of coexistence. The existence of one state very often threatens the existence or integrity of other states. Thus the national security problem is the result. Buzan contends that one needs to understand the concept of security in order to have a proper understanding of the national security problem. Unfortunately the security concept has here-to-fore been so poorly developed as to be unequal to that task.[1]

The concepts that have dominated analysis of the national security problem to date have been the power concept

propounded by the Realist school and the peace concept advanced by what Buzan loosely labels the Idealist school. It is the Realist school, founded in its modern variant by Hans Morganthau,[2] that has generally dominated the formal literature. Within the universe of debate created by these opposing views, however, the security concept has played a secondary role. From the power perspective, security derives from successfully applied power strategies; either by victory or dominance over adversaries, or through successfully balancing and stablizing a dynamic international system. Power successfully applied produces security. From the stand point of peace, on the otherhand, security is merely the tautological consequence of a renunciation or control of war and the means to wage it. Buzan argues contrarily that security should be viewed as a separate concept. Security, he believes, should be viewed as a concept standing between power and peace which helps to illucidate both.[3]

Buzan, consequently, claims that security is an underdeveloped concept. Though it is widely used in the literature as a central organizing concept by both practictioners and academics, the literature on security _per se_ is unbalanced. Buzan describes a short list of authors who have briefly wrestled with the problem of explicating the security concept. He mentions John Herz's introduction of the "security dilemma" in the 1950's;[4] Robert Jervis's recent attempts to build on Herz by introducing the notion of

"security regimes;"[5] and Richard Ashley's "critique of reductionist, actor-oriented, narrowly focused approaches to security analysis" (what he nominated "techno-rationality") as representing positive contributions toward the potential development of the security concept.[6] But he mentions quite a few other authors as having come away from their attempts to describe the security concept with resignation at the prospects of a rigorous definition. As shall be seen below, these authors were often rendering a muted criticism of the Realist dominated literature. In that literature...

> security is seldom addressed in terms other than the policy interests of particular authors or groups, and the discussion has a heavy military emphasis. Endless disputes rage about the particularities of secuirty policy both within and between states. The discussion is normally set within very limited temporal and conceptual frameworks, and general notions like "dominance" and "stability" mark the limits of attempts to give enduring meaning to the idea of security.[7]

Security is an extensively used core concept. It is used so often in fact that many authors have become irritated at the form that its use has taken. Further, its exploration seems to promise to clarify many of the theoretical dilemmas which it, in itself, symbolizes. Why, therefore, has such a widely used core concept gone unexplored for so long? Buzan offers five lines of explanation regarding missed this opportunity.

The first reason is simply that the security concept is too complex. Since security is an example of an "essentially contested concept" it necessarily generates unsolvable debates. Unsolvable because they have an "ideological element which renders empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of resolving the dispute."[8] Thus, security like democracy, justice, and freedom admits of no pre-ordained, agreed upon definition and will always be susceptable to contrary conceptualizations. According to Buzan:

> The utility of these concepts stems in some paradoxical way from whatever it is that makes them inherently ambiguous, and it is their ambiguity which normally stimulates theoretical discussion about them. They indicate an area of concern rather than a precise condition, and consequently require theoretical analysis in order to identify the boundaries of their application, the contradictions which occur within them, and the significance for them of new developments. The domain and contradictions of security have not been adequately explored, and the reason cannot be found in the inherent difficulty of the task.[9]

Perhaps, but I believe there are several points about the complexity issue that Buzan does not take the time to make. First, one could wonder if there are, in fact, degrees of complexity between "politically contested concepts". Concepts like democracy and freedom might be characterized as

definitionally contested -- the answer to "What is democracy?"
or "What is freedom?" being more or less a matter of
preference. Concepts like security on the other hand may have
a paradoxical quality richer than other "essentially contested
concepts". In other words the level of complexity involved in
the security concept may derive from an inherent complexity
not entirely derivable from its contestability. Even if you
agree about what security is you may disagree about whether
you have it. Second, consider the position of would be
theoreticians. If a concept is complex enough, and conceptual
clarity is highly valued by academic critics, there may be a
reluctance to use that concept descriptively.

Buzan thought that the scope for overlap between
security and power was a more convincing explanation.

> In the Realist orthodoxy, power
> dominated both as end and as means.
> Security necessarily shrank conceptually
> to being a way of saying either how well
> any particular state or allied group of
> states was doing in the struggle for
> power, or how stable the balance of power
> overall appeared to be. Reduced to
> little more than a synonym for power,
> security could have little independent
> relevance in wider systemic terms, and
> therefore the security dilemma approach
> could function at best as a minor adjunct
> to the power model of international
> relations.[10]

While security and power are not the same idea, they sometimes
appear to be nearly identical. Under conditions of war or

imminent danger (England or France in the late 1930's for example), Buzan contends, power and security concepts tend to become fused. Given the era of formulation of the Realist school (bridging the Second World War and the early-middle Cold War), security as power could be advanced as a straight forward and, in most particulars, correct perspective bulwarked by experience.

The third reason for the conceptual underdevelopment of security advanced by Buzan lay in the nature of the different revolts against Realism. The Idealists were particularly unsympathetic to developing the concept of security. First, they felt obliged to stay clear of security since the idea of "collective security" had so clearly failed to prevent war in the inter-war period. Second, apparently they acquiesced in thinking of security as synonimous with power just as the Realists had done. But since it was to be found so repetitively in the Realist vocabulary, they probably saw no reason to explicate their rival's terms. The Idealist eventually bent in the direction of "policies for peace" such as arms control, disarmament, and international cooperation. Here, from something of a "Realist-Idealist" position, they could in some areas speak in tangential terms to the dominant Realist vocabulary and, furthermore, might stand a better chance of influencing actual policy.

A later reaction against Realism centered on the concept of interdependence.[11] The interdependence school of thought

was inclined "to push the traditional, military power-oriented Realist model into the background, seeing its competitive, fragmented, force-based approach as increasingly irrelevent to the interwoven network world of international political economy. This attitude tended to produce a two-tiered framework. Military considerations were seen as largely marginal to outcomes involving interdependence issues..[12] This is where Buzan senses a missed opportunity. For he sees in the interdependence scheme of things a close parallel with the dynamic, interactive security analytic operating within some form of an international anarchy. Unfortunately, the interdependence school tended to bracket analytically the military threat system away from the 'real world' of 'important' international relations. Buzan believes, however, that the spirit of the interdependence logic along with "a more interconnective concept of security" could be integrated and suggests that his book (People, States, and Fear) can help to illustrate what such an integration would look like.[13]

Buzan suggests further that the prospects for the development of the security concept suffered from "the great methodological upheaval" which consumed the international relations field from the late 1950's through the mid-1970's. In brief, behavioralism found all conceptual quagmires disheartening -- and tended, curiously, to accept whatever political concepts that were ready at hand as a sort of dictionary of acceptable usage and study subjects. With respect to the study of international affairs it was almost

certain that behavioralism would find an affinity with a "realist " school of thought. Buzan is kinder on this point, suggesting that...

> Behaviorism, with its scientific, value-free, and quantitative concerns, was by definition not suited to the universe of essentially contested concepts. Indeed, it was an explicit revolt against the dominance of such an ambiguous and non-cumulative mode of thought. Behaviouralists had to deal with power, because it represented the dominant orthodoxy. The prospect of yet another operational quaqmire like security could hardly be expected to arouse them to enthusiasm.[14]

This quote from Buzan as much as says that behavioralism is an inappropriate mode of studying all political matters, though his intent is clearly to not sound too harsh. The fact is the era of behavioralism, particularly in the United States, was particularly inconducive to the development of conceptual analysis generally. The conceptual developments that were done followed the lines of systems logic or of rationality models such as the "logic of collective goods".[15] These, of course, had some marginal acceptability from the behavioralist viewpoint.

A fourth reason for the under-development of the security concept can be found in the nature of strategic studies. This is important because strategic studies

represent the largest sub-field in the discipline and they directly address the subject of security. He pictures stategic studies as the race horse of the international relations field. Conditions there -- shifting international amities and enmities plus rapid-fire changes in weapons technology and deployment -- are so chaotic that the field barely finds time to stay ahead of itself, much less to take the time to do detailed analysis of its core concept. Therefore, stategic studies have tended to remain encapsulated in the traditional Realist orientation, taking little cognizance of rival schools of thought. The approach of many strategic studies have been "heavily conditioned by the status quo orientations of hegemonic countries safely removed from the pressure of large attached neighbors."[16] Furthermore, it tends to be so directly policy bound that it's theoretical efforts have narrow applicability. Of course, it exhibits a military orientation "derived from its roots in military strategy and defense studies."

Up to this point Buzan's analysis of the reasons security has been so weakly developed in the formal studies of international relations identified developments within the field itself. In summary these reasons might be described sequentially as follows: "Collective security" is very larely debunked by the inter-war experience. The war experience of unpreparedness and the failure of appeasement followed by Cold War hostility favor the development of a view of international affairs as rife with power relations and a consciousness,

therefore, of a certain meaningfullness to all military capability. Academic analysis developed accordingly -- being described in what came to be known as the Realist school. In their scheme of things power was the operational concept and security but a target value. Yet security was ready at hand as justification and goal and seemed to require little clarification; since if you had it that was good, but if you didn't you were in trouble and had better get busy and enhance your (military) position. Rival schools of thought thus shied away from a concept so comfortably situated within a dominant school. In the meantime methodological developments highly prejudice the chances that alternative conceptual schemes would be explored. In fact, the methodological bent of behavioralism shied away from overly "political" or potentially revisionist intellectual activities. Finally, the sub-field that was most heavily interested in military and strategic problems held closely to the view point of US policy problems and perspectives. Thus, the missfiring of the development of the security concept seems to have consisted of a compounding of fortutitous developments.

A final reason for the underdevelopment of the security concept involves a recognition of the advantages to policy practicioners of an ambiguous security concept. The lack of precise definitions of national security, or perhaps even better, an elastic or pliable definition allows a grander scope for rationalization and justification of a maximized

forward positioning of military and diplomatic deployments. An ambiguious security concept is a great convience to the political and economic advocates of an expansive military/diplomatic effort in their political and budgetary competition with other claimants for scarce national resources and political attentions. In the context of intra-national resource and political competitions, the military and military industries of both the Soviet Union and the United States share a mutual interest in exaggerating threats to national security. How, though, can this preference by practicioners for an ambiguous security concept get translated into the underdevelopmet of the security concept by academicians? Is there some mechanism by which the academic study of political issues leaves a space (perhaps even prepares a space) for policy actors to rationalize and justify their activities, policies, and programs. One might consider that in large part there is an extraodinarily close relationship between the academic disciplines that study the subject and the practicioners who are involved in it. One could study the linkages between "think tanks", associated accademia, defense industry derived political moneys, and the research grants flowing to universities and discern a community of interests. As this "security establishment" elaborates itself there develop institutional and political committments to an established set of "security" desiderata. Maybe there will be few who wish to upset the apple cart.

There is a counter-thesis to Buzan's analysis of the

reasons security has been underdeveloped. This thesis would argue that Buzan has presumed falsely that "power" and "peace" (or, that is, some concept other than security) has dominated the thinking of the field; when, in fact, no concept has -- not in a truly "conceptual" sense. Indeed, it is hard to think of a study that has treated "power" and "peace" as the focussed object of a book length analysis of their inherent implications for the international relations field like Buzan does here with security. Has Buzan raised a straw-man? The reason no one had done a thorough analysis of security before was probably similar to the reason they had not yet done a thorough analysis of power; i.e., that a critical sensitivity to language has not here-to-fore been required of social scientist. The slow rise in interest in language sensitive philosophical orientations such as hermaneutics, phenomenology, critical theory, and others, has produced a spurt of interest in the 'what' and 'how' of ideation, discourse, meaning universes, and so forth. Those so inclined might be expected to turn to the core concepts of a field as starting points for such inquiries.

This being the case, what concept would generate the most interest in the international relations field? Power? What made power so attractive to begin with was that it is an answer to questions about what is important in international affairs. What seems decisive in the "Who gets what?" problems of international competitions is that redundant answer; Power.

But what is power as a concept? I believe you can divide power into two parts. It has a conceptual part proper, consisting of its standard meanings and implications. But the word "power" in its international politics sense also contains an element which requires of the person using it (or understanding its use in that sense) that a certain perspective is being indicated. Let us call this its "convictional" part.

Power as conceptual content stripped of its convictional component has problems. It is even in this sense a mix of ideas and implications. There is, in part, an unstated assumption that is usually implied, that greater strengths always dominate or win over lesser strengths. "Power" also seems to contain a metaphor imagining a human relational physics that possesses a fluid like substance (i.e. power) that obeys the classical Newtonian laws of physics. (The "power vacuum" is one famous example of this.) There are times, of course, when thinking in these kinds of "power" terms is appropriate; the assumption and metaphor both fitting the problems under consideration. But even then the assumption is not always true, and the metaphor is not particularly enlightening.

Power, as it has been used in the international relations literature however, is more conviction than concept; it is a prescription for a "realistic" perspective. The power conviction can be derived from what could be called the power (or defense) dilemma: Should a state respond to the potential

threats of other states benignly or actively? Do you treat potential threats as threats? The power conviction says yes -- potential threats and threats must be treated the same. At least as those evincing this conviction would have it, it is the duty of those who conduct state policy to treat potential threats as threats since the capacity to dominate has always (within human experience) led to the will to dominate. One might observe the power accretions of other states with indifference -- believing in the denials that any harm is meant by their existence; but the realist knows better. The existence of the weapon is the intent to use it. The problem with the power conviction is that it is self-generating. If I assume all potential threats are threats, then I will counter-threat rightly or wrongly. My adversary, if he is a realist like me, will then be forced to use the capacities underlying his potential to threaten to organize and direct unambiguous threats. Realist live in a world of self-fulfilling phrophecies.

The contrary conviction -- the peace conviction -- is aimed squarely at the self-fulfilling prophecy aspect of the Realist position. Unfortunately, like power the peace "concept" is tall on convictions and short on conceptual content. Buzan found these two concepts dominating the field of international relations only because they each contained the emotive element about which the field divided. They are poles beaconing the extremes of moral conviction; one

representing the lesson of the first world war and the other the lesson of the second. By contrast security is prosaic. It is, in fact, the dilemma without the convictions. So why study security instead of one of the other terms? If one seriously desires to study the international field and, further, one surveys the standard concepts before doing so, one might pick that concept which seemed to have the greatest conceptual mass as well as one not yet overly adopted by a philosophical orientation. This is the value of Buzan's efforts. He makes a first survey of that concept most critical to the core dilemmas of international relations.

Buzan treats the security concept analytically. He adopts a three level framework; the individual, the state, and the international (systems) levels of analysis. He labels these levels one, two, and three respectively. His analysis, therefore, appears simple and heavily structured at first sight. As he develops his critique, however, it becomes clear that he uses individual, state, and interstate environment as reference points more than as skeletal sub-structure. By the end of the book he is warning the reader away from simplistic notions of the kind he appears to have begun with.[17]

He uses his three part breakdown to explicate both links and contradictions between the different levels; developing, more than anything, the notion of the problematic nature of the state's continuing existence and well being. This is one reason that the security concept is largely discribed as the problem of "national security". As his argument unfolds his

analysis becomes loaded with identifiable diachotomies (strong vs weak states, individual vs state security, mercantilist vs liberal international economic orientations) around which political opinion seems to divide. These are used to illustrate a rich array of dilemmas operating within and between various levels of his analysis. These provide the really interesting comments and insights that Buzan is able to make, and are indicative of the value of the critical lens that is produced by a closer attention to the conceptual implications imbedded in security. Buzan's book could be outlined by a short series of these dilemmas.

He begins with the Hobbesian vision of the predicament of the "state of nature". The creation of the state results; but this produces a new security dilemma -- the one that exists between the individual and the state.[18] The "dilemma" in most dilemmas is that they produce a paradox. In this case the individual agrees with other individuals to found an over-arching power, but only finds himself subjected by that power as a result. The nature of the state created becomes the paramount issue in the security relationship between the state and individual. At this point Buzan introduces a diachotomy, that between minimal and maximal variations of the state, to explicate a security dilemma; i.e., between the individual and state. The book follows this basic pattern as it builds to encompass larger and more intricate layers of the security matrix.

Buzan next treats the second level of his framework. The security dilemmas discoverable seem endless -- precisely because the constitution of a state itself involves the fundlemental problems of that state's integrity. He divides his analysis between those security dilemmas that operate internally to the state's make-up and continued coherence, and those that operate between it and the other state entities in its environment. In the first instance he devides the state into three components; the idea of the state, the physical base of the state, and the institutional expression of the state.[19] Each of these involve integretity dilemmas in themselves; and there are dilemmas that operate between each component. In the second instance he looks at the difficulties of the state as it encounters its international environment. It is at this level that his approach begins to broaden out. He begins with the problems of state identity within an international political order. He then moves to the nature of the international economic system -- which exists as a kind of medium in which, in some senses, the political interstate system exists. Lastly, he explores at length the institutionalization of the defense/security and power/security dilemmas as expressed in the international anarchy. This permits him to make some summary remarks regarding the associated policy difficulties created for forign policy actors. Without saying so he has repeated at the interstate system level, the three part identity of the state discribed above. In brief, Buzan leads us on a grand

tour of the field.

Buzan makes a strong case that the analysis and use of the security concept produces a preferable conceptual apparatus. This preferability can be described by a short list of its attributes. The security concept permits a wide view of the dilemmas of the international environment. It not only invites multi-level analysis; it seems to require it. Unlike the power analytic used by the Realist, the security concept avoids add/sum characterizations of power accretetions. The analysis of security requires an interpretation of the security outputs of one state on the security calculuses of other states. Unlike the peace concept security prevents the nullifying of the nation-state referent; though it helps focus the pertinent issue of just what that referent is. Unlike the realist-idealist deadlock the security analytic allows the analyst to remain unbiased by prior committments. Yet unlike the peace/war dichotomy it preserves the sense of ambivalence (between idealism and realism) inherent in the predicament of the possibility of violence in human relationships. Finally, it inherently epitomizes the degree of complexity of the real world as it is experienced.

ENDNOTES

1. Barry Buzan, p. 1.

2. Hans Morganthau, <u>Politics Amounst Nations</u> (New York: Knopf, 1973, 5th edn.)

3. Buzan, p. 2.

4. John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," <u>World Politics</u>, vol. 2. (1950) p. 157-80.

5. Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," <u>International Organization</u>, 36:2 (1982).

6. Buzan, p. 5.

7. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 3.

8. Richard Little, "Ideology and Change," in Barry Buzan and R.J. Barry Jones (eds), <u>Change and The Study of International</u> Relations (London, Francis Pinter, 1981), p. 35. As quoted by Barry Buzan, <u>People, States and Fear</u>, p. 6.

9. Buzan, p. 6.

10. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 7.

11. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, <u>Power and Interdependence</u> (Boston, Little Brown, 1977).

12. Buzan, p. 8.

13. <u>Ibid</u>.

14. <u>Ibid</u>.

15. Mancur Olson, <u>The Logic of Collective Action</u>, (New York, Schocken Books, 1968).

16. Buzan, p. 9.

17. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 245.

18. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 20.

19. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 40.

APPENDIX A

THESARUS ENTRIES FOR SECURITY, SECURE, AND ASSURANCE

APPENDIX A

THESAURUS ENTRIES FOR SECURITY, SECURE, AND ASSURANCE[1]

SECURITY

1 syn. Safety: assurances, safeness.

2 syn. Stability: firmness, soundness, stableness, steadiness, strength.

3 syn. Pledge: earnest, pawn, token, warrant.

4 syn. Guarantee: bail, bond, surety, warranty, (rel.) assurance, certification, pledge

5 syn. Defense: aegis, armament, armor, guard, protection, safeguard, shield, ward.

SECURE

1 syn. Defend: bulwark, cover, fend, guard, protect, safeguard, screen, shield.

2 syn. Ensure: assure, cinch, insure, (rel.) underwrite.

3 syn. Catch: bag, capture, collar, cotch, get, nail, prehend, take.

4 syn. Fasten: anchor, catch, fix, moor.

5 syn. Get: acquire, annex, chalkup, gain, have, land, obtain, pick up, procure.

ASSURANCE

1 syn. Word: guarantee, pledge, warrant, (rel.) parole, promise, troth, plight, agreement, compact, covenant.

2 syn. Certainty: assuredness, certitude, confidence, conviction, sureness, surety.

3 syn. Safety: safeness, security.

4 syn. Confidence: aplomb, self-assurance, self-assuredness, self-confidence.

[1]Roget's II: The New Thesaurus (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1980), p. 82.

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